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The conventional account of the rise of neoliberalism in Britain is familiar and 
frequently reproduced. It begins with the creation of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) 
by Friedrich Hayek in 1947.1 This long-term intellectual project deliberately stayed 
out of the mainstream until it was gradually given a higher public profile by right-
wing think tanks, notably, in Britain, the Institute of Economic Affairs. Following the 
crisis of the 1970s and the growing discontent with the Keynesian approach to 
economic policy, it culminated in the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979.2 Thus 
Thatcherism is seen as ‘the political embodiment of an intellectual counterrevolution 
against the Keynesian consensus’.3 Moreover, this intellectual counterrevolution was 
carried out in Britain by a very small group of individuals – Maurice Cowling 
suggests as few as about fifty people.4 Many accounts detail and elaborate on 
elements of this conventional account.5 Similarly, there is a wealth of literature 
exploring the interaction of ideas, interests, institutions and economic circumstances 
in explaining this paradigm shift to neoliberalism.6 
 On the other hand, there is also an emerging literature illustrating that this 
conventional account is a caricature: it is flawed, inconsistent and contested in many 
respects. Recent work has rejected the previous contested attempts to define 
neoliberalism in detail. Instead, there has been an acceptance that, while there may be 
certain core beliefs (Turner) or groups of individuals (the Mont Pèlerin Society as a 
‘thought collective’) (Plehwe), no single grand narrative of neoliberalism is possible: 
it should be seen as ‘a complex and varied ideology’, an umbrella concept which has 
evolved over time.7 Plehwe has also shown that social network analysis of the 
attendees of the MPS conferences ‘helps to shed light on the group of less well-known 
neoliberal activists, who all too frequently have remained hidden in the shadow of the 
official leaders and prominent neoliberals’ but who were active in attending MPS 
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conferences.8 In Britain the role of think tanks has also come under scrutiny.9 More 
generally, contemporary historians have begun to unpick the historical background to 
the emergence of Thatcherism.10 
 This chapter extends and develops such recent work on the MPS and on the 
rise of neoliberalism in Britain by exploring the activities and writings of three British 
business economists who acted as advisers at the heart of the business community but 
were members of the MPS and active in the IEA. Hayek tended to be cautious in 
protecting the Mont Pèlerin Society from undue influence from business. For him the 
MPS was a long-term intellectual movement where too much interaction with 
business would muddy and confuse any desire for intellectual clarity. Thus, the main 
relationship of the MPS with business, it is commonly understood, was as a provider 
of finance.11 Similarly, Jackson has shown the growth of business funding of the IEA 
in Britain. 12 While individual business people and individual companies supported the 
IEA, the peak-level representative bodies of business in Britain, the Federation of 
British Industries (FBI), and its successor from 1965, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), play no part in accounts of the rise of neoliberalism in Britain.13 
Indeed, organized business in the form of the Confederation of British Industry is 
conventionally viewed to have lost out with the election of Margaret Thatcher as it 
was tainted with 1970s corporatism. Instead she consulted ideologically sympathetic 
businessmen directly or used the overtly free market Institute of Directors as her route 
to business opinion.14 The CBI has been presented as an obstacle to the rise of 
neoliberalism.  
The focus in this chapter is to illuminate the versions of neoliberalism of three 
business economists giving advice to leading businessmen at the heart of the business 
community, in particular through their critique of the post-war Keynesian Welfare 
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State in Britain. Each was also to some degree an academic economist as well as a 
business adviser. One, John Jewkes, is reasonably well known as an academic 
economist and would meet the definition used by Peden in this volume to define an 
economist. The other two, Arthur Shenfield and Barry Bracewell-Milnes, have 
received virtually no attention to date. Shenfield, having been a lecturer in economics 
during the Second World War, was the Economic Director to the Federation of British 
Industries (FBI) and its successor organisation, the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) between 1955 and 1967. In 1967 he then was seconded from the CBI to be 
Director of a new body, the Industrial Policy Group (IPG), whose membership was 
made up of representatives of big business. Jewkes, on retiring from his chair at 
Oxford, became Shenfield’s replacement at the IPG in 1969, a position he held until 
the IPG was wound up in 1974. Similarly, the third individual here, Barry Bracewell-
Milnes, became the CBI’s new Economic Director within months of Shenfield’s 
departure to the IPG. Bracewell-Milnes had a Ph.D in agricultural economics from 
Cambridge. 15 It is their critical views of the Welfare State espoused as advisers to 
business which are illustrated in the chapter and which culminated in an ideological 
split within the CBI. Crucial here is the row between Bracewell-Milnes and Campbell 
Adamson, the Director-General of the CBI, which ended with the former’s forced 
resignation in 1973.16 This episode highlights the contested nature of economic advice 
at the heart of the British business community – one strand linked to neoliberalism, 
the other corporatist.  
Incorporating the advice of these business economists has significant 
ramifications for our understanding of the process by which neoliberal ideas came to 
the fore in Britain. Given that this advice was being presented to leading businessmen, 
and supported by some, we need to accept that the rise of these ideas was not limited 
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to a small isolated group but found some support more widely. Moreover, these views 
were being presented throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The paper also highlights the 
role of business economists, a group growing rapidly in number in the post-war period 
but, to date, rather ignored. This group may have been an important conduit for the 
spread of neoliberal economic policies from the MPS and IEA to wider society. 
 
Public advocates of neoliberalism within leading business organisations 
With this in mind it is now possible to turn attention to the three individuals whom it 
is argued question this conventional account. Below the Director-General in the FBI 
and the CBI there were various Directors who were responsible for particular subject 
areas (Directorates) and who would work with the chairman of the various 
committees in that subject area. The Director-General and the Directors would draft 
most of the papers which then went to the committees for discussion. They also 
tended to work closely with the chairmen of the committees in their area of 
responsibility. Thus they played an important role in setting the direction of internal 
discussions and external policy statements of the FBI and CBI.17 Two of the three 
individuals considered here were Economic Directors of the FBI and CBI covering 
the period from 1955 to 1973. The third, John Jewkes, replaced Shenfield as Director 
of the Industrial Policy Group in 1969. Although formally separate from the CBI and 
a frequent cause of contention in the CBI leadership, there were close links between 
the CBI and the IPG: the CBI President and the Director-General were ex officio 
members of the IPG, the IPG’s office was in the CBI’s building and its papers were 
commented upon by CBI staff prior to publication. All three individuals, therefore, 
provided economic advice and expertise at the heart of organised business in Britain. 
Each also critiqued the postwar Welfare State in their personal and representative 
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positions on lines almost identical to those emanating from the IEA, indeed they were 
directly involved in the IEA’s efforts in this field. 
 
Arthur Asher Shenfield 
Arthur Shenfield was appointed as the FBI’s Economic Director in 1955. Shenfield is 
noteworthy because he lies close to the centre of the network of frequent participants 
in MPS meetings shown by Plehwe.18 Only those who attended at least half of the 26 
conferences between 1947 and 1986 are included in the figure and Shenfield’s 
proximity to the centre means he attended significantly more and can be regarded as 
highly active in the MPS. Indeed, he was President of the society 1972-74, succeeding 
Milton Friedman. Yet little seems to be known about Shenfield.19 He came to Britain 
in the 1920s with his father, a Russian émigré, and Jewish rabbi, and his brother.20 
They settled in Cardiff, becoming naturalised British in 1927, and Asher Sheinfield, 
as he was called at that time, studied economics and politics at the local university. 
Sheinfield got a position at LSE as Assistant Editor of the London and Cambridge 
Economic Service in 1939. It was at this point that he changed his name by depoll to 
Arthur Asher Shenfield and began associating with other British neoliberals at LSE, 
including Arthur Seldon, later one of the two leading lights in the IEA.21  
 Shenfield was active in the Mont Pèlerin Society soon after the war, giving a 
paper at the 1953 British ‘Regional Meeting’ and two at the full meeting the following 
year in Venice on ‘Democracy, socialism and the rule of law’ and ‘Trade Union 
legislation: situation in Britain’.22 Shenfield’s neoliberal credentials were, therefore, 
firmly established prior to his appointment as the FBI’s Economic Director in 1955. 
He also remained active in the MPS, as shown in Table 1. He had various key 
administrative roles in the MPS but his role peaked with his presidency of the MPS, 
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giving his presidential address on ‘The English disease’.23 In the early years of the 
war, like Arthur Seldon and many of the economists examined in chapters two and 
three, he was active in the Liberal Party. 
 
Table 1 Papers to the Mont Pèlerin Society meetings by Arthur Shenfield 
Year Title 
1954 Democracy, socialism and the rule of law 
 Trade Union Legislation: Situation in Britain 
1957 Liberalism and Colonialism 
1959 No title (session on Industry) 
1961 Small and Big Business 
1962 The Return to Economic Planning in Britain 
1964 Economic planning in the UK: Note on the Case of the National 
Incomes Commission 
1967 Fundamental Constitutional Problems 
1968 Omissions of Government: The Emancipation of Labour 
1970 The Businessman and the Politician 
1974 Presidential Address: The English Disease 
1978 The Political Order of a Free Society 
1984 Unionised Australia: Is It Still “The Lucky Country” 
 The International Labour Organisation: a Tale of Superstition and 
Prestige 
1986 The Legacy of Bruno Leoni 
Source: www.liberaalarchief.be/MPS2005.pdf, inventory of MPS General Meetings.  
  
Stephen Blank suggests that Shenfield’s appointment as the FBI’s Economic 
Director marked a significant change in the organization. First, he was much more 
active and dynamic than his predecessor and the FBI’s Economic Policy Committee 
became more independent and authoritative under his influence. Secondly, his 
approach was more theoretical and neoliberal in nature. Blank believes that this ‘did 
not essentially alter the Federation’s position on economic policy…but he shaped and 
stated them in a more abstract and dogmatic fashion’, adding that Norman Kipping, 
the then Director-General, ‘generally agreed with Shenfield’s views’ and that the 
Federation’s policies after 1955 ‘strongly reflected Shenfield’s influence’.24  
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He was the lead author of a number of key publications by the FBI in this 
period and his views are discernible in such publications, notably the Federation’s 
March 1957 statement Britain’s Economic Problems and Policies.25 As the foreword 
put it: 
 
Much of the blame rests on successive governments for taking too large a 
portion of the national output. It [the report] shows how attempts by budgetary 
manipulation to limit the inflation thus generated have produced a level of 
taxation harmful to thrift, efficiency and enterprise…. 
 There must be a radical reduction in government and local authority 
expenditure in order to pave the way for reductions in taxation designed to 
encourage enterprise, efficiency and thrift, and also to make room for the 
necessary expansion in investment and exports. To end inflation the 
government must use its power over the monetary system with a firm hand, 
and it must seek ways of improving the technique of monetary management.26 
 
It was thus forthright in its argument and its anti-Keynesian approach, arguing that the 
way to reduce demand was to operate stricter control over the money supply.27 Its 
argument is similar to the IEA publication Not Unanimous, produced in 1960 as a 
critique of the Report of the Radcliffe Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System.28 The FBI report concluded: 
 
For expansion we must produce an atmosphere of opportunity; we must put a 
premium on risk-taking and adaptability; we must stimulate investment and 
give it an opportunity to reap high reward. For stability we need the power and 
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skill of the state in the field of monetary management and control; but we must 
reduce its power and scope as a spender and as a direct participant in economic 
activity.29 
 
For Shenfield, Britain had an unhealthy obsession with full employment rather than 
with the competitive power of the economy.30 
In 1963 Shenfield took leave from the FBI to be the Ford Foundation Visiting 
Professor of Business Economics at the Graduate School of Business, headed by 
George Stigler, at the University of Chicago, that stronghold of neoliberal ideas.31 
However, he returned to the FBI and stayed on as Economic Director of the newly-
created CBI in 1965, a time when a number of staff retired or left. In 1967, as 
business criticism of government policy grew, he was seconded from the CBI to the 
newly created Industrial Policy Group (IPG).32 The group, led by Sir Paul Chambers, 
the Chairman of ICI, consisted of about twenty heads of large British companies and 
aimed to study ‘the fundamental causes of the malaise of the British economy’ and to 
increase attention to these issues in popular debate.33 The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, James Callaghan, dubbed the group ‘potentially sinister’ and led by 
‘dubious people’. Opinion in the group was diverse but there was a clear neoliberal 
dimension to it.34  
The IPG gave Shenfield more freedom to defend the role of private enterprise 
and to attack the Labour government and, indeed, postwar economic policy with 
renewed vigour.35 The culprits behind the rise of such flawed economic policy were 
clear to him: 
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Post-war policies have been principally guided by the ideas propounded a 
generation ago by Keynes, Beveridge and by the authors of the 1944 White 
Paper on Employment Policy (Cmd. 6527)…. 
 In attributing the tendencies of post-war policies, whether under 
Conservative or Labour Governments, to Keynes, Beveridge and the 1944 
White Paper, we do not at all wish to imply that these sources were exactly 
similar in character or inspiration. The aim of full employment, regardless of 
other vital purposes of policy, is attributable to Beveridge only.36 
 
As he saw it the errors of policy were: the take-over by the state of economic activity; 
the erosion of the market and the weakening of its disciplines; the failure to apply 
state power efficiently where it has been needed; and the application of state power 
where it has been unnecessary and damaging.  
 In arguing against ‘the penal taxation of higher incomes’ he often focussed on 
the Welfare State and the National Health Service (NHS).37  His arguments often 
mirrored those of his friend at the IEA, Arthur Seldon, who was engaged in a fierce 
debate with Richard Titmuss and others over the Welfare State.38 In 1961 Shenfield 
wrote a piece which, in turn, criticised the Conservative government for failing to 
control the growth of public expenditure, and experts and their biases in favour of 
increased expenditure, in particular, those in the field of social administration (i.e. 
Titmuss and his supporters) ‘in which it is possible to erect an academic reputation on 
a foundation of snippets of descriptive work, law, statistics, and general guesswork’.39 
He went on to outline an archetypal neoliberal view of the Welfare State: 
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The Welfare State rests on humbug because it was ostensibly established to 
relieve poverty while what in fact it does is something else. Beveridge’s four 
giants –Want, Disease, Squalor and Ignorance – were to be banished from the 
land and minimum standards were to be secured for everybody. In fact the true 
purpose of the welfare state is to socialise the provision of certain services, 
whereby it actually reduces standards below what they might be…. 
 The method of the welfare state is to require that everyone must pay 
for and be free to take state-provided services in order that those that cannot 
provide them for themselves shall have them. Thus it raises taxation to a level 
which reduces the nation’s wealth by weakening the incentive to produce and 
save….It undermines both the personal responsibilities which are the warp and 
woof of freedom and the family responsibilities on which the wholesomeness 
of society rests. It teaches the electorate to vote for things that most of them do 
not intend to pay for. Above all, by providing services for all it fails to provide 
fully effective services for those that are really in need.40 
  
To turn things around means testing needed to be used for all state social services, 
private supply of these services needed to be promoted and developed, and charging 
used more widely in the interim before private supply took over. 
 Shenfield reiterated these views on various occasions within the CBI and the 
IPG, but more explicitly in the IPG as he felt rather constrained by the day-to-day 
grind of CBI work.41 In the IPG’s second report on public expenditure, drafted by 
Shenfield, he set out his position: there were two great causes of concern 
underpinning the upward trend of public expenditure. They were ‘the provision of 
services to all consumers free of charge, or at a charge far below cost’ and ‘the 
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subsidisation of persons or business activities with a view to directing the economy 
away from the impress of free market forces, and therefore away from maximum 
productivity’.42 Curtailing, but not completely abandoning these positions would 
allow provision for the genuinely under-privileged to expand as resources would be 
focussed on those in most need.  
Turning to specific policy changes, he noted, ‘The history of the National 
Health Service has been one of progressive disappointment of expectations. It is 
almost a classic example of the counter-productive effects of the principle of 
universality, financed by taxation, and supply free of charge.’43 He proposed a three-
tier medical service, consisting of freedom to contract out whereby those making no 
national health service contributions would pay for the full cost of any treatment; a 
National Health Service run on a part-cost basis; and selective ‘and generous’ aid for 
those on incomes below that required for treatment on a part-cost basis. Turning to 
education he argued for loans for students in higher education and that it should not 
be compulsory for children to stay at school from 15 to 16 while, in housing policy, 
rent controls and subsidies needed to be removed. On pensions, while ‘people like 
Titmuss, Townsend and Abel Smith’ criticised occupational pension schemes, 
Shenfield ‘would not accept them as authorities on anything’.44 He continued to 
expound such a neoliberal critique of the Welfare State after his 1969 retirement from 
the IPG.45 
Thus both in published papers and in internal papers for leading businessmen 
Shenfield propounded and elaborated a position during the 1950s and 1960s which 
was clearly neoliberal and reflected his active engagement with the Mont Pèlerin 
Society and his close friendship with Arthur Seldon, who was saying many of the 
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same things via the IEA. Shenfield was clearly at odds with what has subsequently 
become known as the postwar consensus.  
 
John Jewkes 
John Jewkes, like Shenfield, was active in the MPS, being its President in 1962-64. Of 
the three, he was the one most clearly with an academic presence and whose work has 
been more widely read. Jewkes returned from wartime service to Manchester in 1946 
as Stanley Jevons Professor of Political Economy before moving to Oxford in 1948 to 
a chair in economic organization where he stayed until he retired in 1969.46 Jewkes 
came to popular attention for his coruscating attack on post-war controls and planning 
in Ordeal by Planning, published in 1948.47 With the revival of planning in the 1960s 
Jewkes reprinted the essay with a new section on planning in the sixties.48 He also 
wrote more widely at the time of his distaste for nationalisation. Indeed, Jewkes 
played a leading role in the IEA-led assault on the Welfare State in the early 1960s. 
The Genesis of the British National Health Service, written with his wife, was 
presented as the first of a series of planned works on the subject and opened by 
explaining why the book ‘may seem unduly critical of the British National Health 
Service’.49 The pair went on to provide one of the first critiques of Titmuss’s defence 
of the National Health Service, ‘a medical system’, which Jewkes believed, ‘seemed 
doomed to remain second- or third-rate’.50  
In 1969, following his retirement from Oxford, it was Jewkes who replaced 
Shenfield as Director of the Industrial Policy Group. Jewkes ‘gladly accepted [the 
post] because [he] sympathised with the aims of the Group and because my academic 
studies had always led me towards conclusions, concerning the sure foundation of a 
vigorous system of private enterprise, similar to those held by the members of the 
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Group’.51 He was a known critic of the government’s prices and incomes policies and, 
with that, of the CBI’s voluntary price control.52 However, Jewkes was less critical 
than Shenfield of the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy.53 While he accepted 
that it was ‘a “Keynesian” document’, Jewkes refuted the argument that the White 
Paper was a source of Britain’s postwar problems: ‘The Paper was a cautious 
statement, promulgated by the famous wartime coalition government, thought out and 
written by a group of middle-of-the-road economists, accepted by Keynes himself and 
formulating a way of maintaining rough stability of employment and prices through 
the manipulation of aggregate demand but also embodying a set of clear warnings of 
the conditions to be satisfied if adverse reactions, and especially inflation, were to be 
avoided’.54 In his view, those that disputed this were either ignorant of the White 
Paper’s contents or misunderstood it. If there was blame for the obsession with full 
employment then here he agreed with Shenfield that Beveridge and his colleagues 
were the real culprits.55 Thus Jewkes held broadly similar views to Shenfield on the 
desirable framework for economic and social policy but did not always agree on the 
actual nature of policy implemented. Likewise he held a more nuanced view of 
monetarism in which he was willing to compromise with the Keynesian position. 56 
  
Barry Bracewell-Milnes 
Shenfield’s departure to the Industrial Policy Group did not mark a rejection of 
neoliberal economic advice in the CBI. For a matter of months the CBI’s next 
Economic Director was D. Taylor but in 1968 he was in turn replaced by Dr J. Barry 
Bracewell-Milnes. After completing a Ph.D at King’s College Cambridge on the 
marketing of milk in Western Europe, he acted as an economic adviser in the iron and 
steel industry and was then appointed by the FBI in 1964. In 1965 he was given the 
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title of Assistant Economic Director in the CBI, promoted to Deputy Economic 
Director on Shenfield’s departure, and then to Economic Director in 1968. He left the 
CBI in 1973 to become Economic Adviser to the more right-wing Institute of 
Directors, a post he held until 1996.57 Like Shenfield, after leaving the CBI 
Bracewell-Milnes published widely, mainly in the area of taxation, and on neoliberal 
lines for many neoliberal and libertarian organisations.58 
 Though never as central to the MPS as Shenfield or Jewkes, Bracewell-Milnes 
was a member of the society.59 He also moved in the same circles as Shenfield and 
Jewkes: the IEA, the Adam Smith Institute, the Libertarian Alliance and other 
neoliberal groups. He became chairman of the Adam Smith Club. In 1974 he was one 
of eleven signatories to an open letter to the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, arguing 
that the only cure for inflation was increasing unemployment.60 Among the other 
signatories were Harry Johnson, E.V. Morgan, David Laidler, Brian Griffiths and S.H. 
Frankel. 
While he was CBI Economic Director Bracewell-Milnes made clear his 
neoliberal outlook. His line of argument typically stressed the need for a reduction in 
tax levels and a shift in the burden of taxation from direct to indirect taxation.61 
Bracewell-Milnes was known ‘to take a classical view of private enterprise and 
market economics’ and this can be discerned in CBI publications and internal 
discussions at this time.62 His influence can be seen, in particular,  in the CBI’s 
representations during the annual pre-budget lobbying of government. In 1968 the 
CBI budget representation, the first drafted by Bracewell-Milnes as the CBI’s 
Economic Director, was much more comprehensive than previously and called for a 
programme of tax reform not just for that budget but for the longer term on the 
grounds that the principal ways the budget could help the economy was by ‘re-
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creating confidence at home and abroad’ and that the tax system ‘penalises effort and 
thrift and favours consumption’.63 Accordingly, the CBI proposed a broad shift from 
direct to indirect taxation, including reductions in corporation tax, income tax, surtax, 
capital gains tax, betterment levy and estate duty. The CBI’s 1969 budget 
representations re-stated the long-term programme of tax reform and this also formed 
the basis of the 1970 representations.64  
Bracewell-Milnes’s policy preferences on the Welfare State were made 
explicit in a row within the CBI between himself and the corporatist Director-General, 
Campbell Adamson. There were long-standing ‘differences of opinion about certain 
aspects of the CBI’s affairs’ between Bracewell-Milnes and Adamson.65 These 
differences festered from 1970 until bursting out into a full-scale argument in 1973, 
resulting in Bracewell-Milnes’s forced resignation that year. At the CBI’s Economic 
Committee in November 1970 Adamson, supported by Sir Hugh Weeks, the 
committee’s chairman, proposed that the budget representations should contain some 
proposals for tax relief for ‘the poorer sections of society’.66 At the committee’s next 
meeting, unhappy that this point had not been taken on board sufficiently by 
Bracewell-Milnes, Adamson suggested that the representations ‘should give greater 
attention to measures which would afford some immediate relief to poorer sections of 
the community’.67 More than this, he suggested the money to fund this could come 
from modifying the reductions called for in surtax, estates duty and capital gains tax, 
all consistently at the heart of Bracewell-Milnes’s recommendations. 
As a sign of the distance between the two positions, a rare and special joint 
meeting of the Taxation Panel and the Economic Committee was called at short notice 
in order to try to resolve this difference.68 Again Adamson opened by calling for 
proposals helping the lower paid. Alun Davies, chair of the Taxation Panel, responded 
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by urging caution against such changes. Davies ‘saw eye to eye on almost every 
matter’ with Bracewell-Milnes and, like Bracewell-Milnes was at odds with 
Adamson’s ‘middle-of-the-road, consensus approach’, believing it was impossible to 
have egalitarianism and growth.69  Several others present called for a significant 
reduction in surtax in line with Bracewell-Milnes’s suggestion, but Adamson, refused 
to budge.70 Adamson wanted to propose raising the threshold for liability to income 
tax to remove one million lower paid from that tax liability and to extend family 
income supplements. Again there was resistance with one member questioning 
whether it was appropriate for this to come from the CBI but Adamson once more 
won the argument.  
This clear split between Bracewell-Milnes and Adamson was renewed over 
the content of the 1973 budget representations. At the CBI’s Taxation Panel meeting 
in December 1972, Bracewell-Milnes outlined the guidance from a Special Budget 
Committee which had noted but ignored the Taxation Panel’s view that the CBI 
should ‘not concern itself with detailed recommendations on behalf of the lower 
income earners’.71 From the other side of the argument, Adamson explained to the 
CBI Council on 17th January 1973 why the Taxation Committee’s budget 
representations, drafted by Bracewell-Milnes, had been amended.72 Firstly, he 
suggested, ‘because of the need for as much cooperation as possible between the two 
sides of industry at the present stage of the battle against inflation, the CBI’s 
representations ought not to advocate in too strong and general terms the reduction of 
estate duty’. Secondly, Adamson, supported by Sir John Partridge, soon to be the CBI 
President, explained that since the CBI had been emphasising the importance of food 
prices in the cost of living, a new proposal had been added asking for the zero-rating 
of foods subject to purchase tax, the main form of indirect taxation at this time in 
 18 
Britain .73 Members of the Taxation Committee and the Taxation Panel on the CBI 
Council questioned these changes, emphasising the amount of work carried out by 
CBI staff, Bracewell-Milnes and his colleagues, in formulating the budget 
representations and arguing that the zero-rating of food should be withdrawn – this 
was an issue for the food industry not the CBI. Nevertheless, Adamson then read out 
revised versions of part of the budget representations for approval, which was given.74 
Pointedly, Adamson’s report for the March Council meeting ‘applauded’ the zero-
rating of food and young children’s clothing in the budget.75  
In the meantime Bracewell-Milnes was forced to resign. As a leading article in 
The Times put it, this was not a clash of personalities but ‘a clash of ideologies’.76 
Adamson himself explained that ‘the direction the CBI is moving in was not to his 
[Bracewell-Milnes’s] liking’.77 From the other side of the argument, Bracewell-
Milnes referred to his intellectual opponents as ‘the enemy’.78 Having left the CBI 
Bracewell-Milnes was quickly appointed to a similar role at the neoliberal-inclined 
Institute of Directors.  One IEA publication turned Bracewell-Milnes into a neoliberal 
martyr: he was sacked ‘for supporting capitalism, free enterprise and the market 
economy’.79 There was even a party organised by the IEA to mark the 30th 
anniversary of the sacking. And, as noted above, Mrs Thatcher appeared to favour the 
Institute of Directors over the CBI for business advice once she became Prime 
Minister.  
All three of these business economists at the heart of the business community 
had a similar view of the economy and of the role of the government in it. Bracewell-
Milnes typified this position, redolent of Shenfield’s 1957 FBI paper: ‘There is no one 
cause [of Britain’s economic problems] but major causes may well be the system of 
taxation, public expenditure and restrictions on overseas direct investment… and to 
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these might be added our industrial relations and our social security systems.’80 He 
added, ‘Historically government intervention has failed lamentably as a means to 
maintain industrial efficiency’. But it is also important to note that while their outlook 
was supported by parts of the business community others, favouring a more 
corporatist outlook, contested this position. Indeed, attitudes to the Welfare State lay 
at the heart of this division. 
  
Conclusion  
Highlighting the views and roles of these three advocates of neoliberalism adds to our 
understanding of this intellectual movement and its rise from the creation of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society in 1947 to Margaret Thatcher’s election victory in 1979. Four points 
in particular can be made. First, these three individuals were neoliberals, both as part 
of the thought collective of the MPS and in terms of their stated values. Each 
endorsed the four generic principles that Turner has highlighted as being at the heart 
of neoliberalism – the importance of market order; the role of the state in preserving 
individual liberties; the advocacy of minimal state intervention; and the importance of 
private property. However, on certain issues or details the three were at odds with 
each other and this illustrates the complex and disputed nature of neoliberalism.  
 Secondly, they were all economists, though not necessarily academic 
economists. There is a danger in focussing narrowly on academic economists when 
looking at post-Second World War economic opinion, particularly with regard to a 
movement like neoliberalism. Since 1945 there has been an enormous growth in the 
number of economists employed outside of academia, be it in government, business or 
the City.81 These may not be academically ‘eminent’ but their incorporation into the 
story of the rise of neoliberalism in Britain adds to our understanding of the process 
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that occurred. Conventional accounts highlight the role of American economists, 
particularly those at Chicago, and the close links that these American economists had 
with the IEA.82 These links were crucial but there was still the need for their ideas to 
become accepted into wider British society just at the time that academic economics 
was becoming highly mathematical and abstracted from the real world and where the 
vast majority of British academic economists were unsympathetic to the neoliberal 
message. Economists working in the City or any sort of business environment were 
potentially more sympathetic to that message.83 These were not only a growing group 
but an increasingly organised one too.84 
 Thirdly, and related to the second point, the chapter confirms and develops 
Plehwe’s contention that to understand the MPS, and hence neoliberalism, it is 
necessary to look beyond the Nobel Prize winners. All three individuals – Shenfield, 
Bracewell-Milnes and Jewkes – were members of the MPS, two even became 
Presidents, yet only Jewkes could be described as an academic economist. The other 
two would have regarded themselves as intellectuals but worked in the applied world 
of giving economic advice to organised business. Hayek’s focus on the MPS as a 
long-term intellectual movement needs some qualification and the emphasis on this 
aspect may be a reflection of reading back from the neoliberal turn taken in the last 
few decades. Clearly, it was an intellectual movement but that was only part of the 
story: it was also about getting those ideas implemented by governments and accepted 
by society. Although he discounted the short-term political and practical tasks of 
gaining popular support it was necessary to ‘raise and train an army of fighters for 
freedom’ and this tends to get forgotten when focussing on those most famous.85 On 
this basis it becomes imperative to understand the activities of individuals like 
Shenfield, Bracewell-Milnes and Jewkes and others of that ilk if we are to 
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comprehend fully the process by which neoliberalism became a dominant paradigm of 
thought. MPS members like these can be seen as brokers who bridged the gap 
between the intellectual ideas and debate of the MPS and the rest of society. Such 
brokers are now often presented as key players, with significant social capital, in the 
diffusion of ideas from one network to another.86 To date that brokerage role has 
focussed on the IEA and other right-wing think tanks but it is important to start to 
consider other alternative or supportive links as well. 
 Finally, the paper alters our understanding of the rise of neoliberal ideas in 
Britain. The existing emphasis on the isolation of a small coterie of neoliberal 
outsiders in Britain during the dominant period of Keynesianism seems overstated. 
All three individuals had clear links to the heart of organised business and big 
business and each acted as an advocate for neoliberal ideas in that arena. This took 
place for virtually the whole of the era associated with the post-war Keynesian 
consensus. Thus we need to be careful not to exaggerate the strength and spread of 
support for the key elements of that consensus – the mixed economy, the welfare state 
and full employment. All three were strongly and consistently critiqued by Shenfield, 
Bracewell-Milnes and Jewkes and these critiques found support and endorsement for 
their views at the heart of the business community. As Boswell and Peters have 
argued, over the postwar period British business remained split over its attitude to 
Keynesian-style policies and to corporatism.87 This split in opinion within the 
business community was shown in its starkest form in the open warfare within the 
CBI between Adamson and Bracewell-Milnes. Thus, business support for 
neoliberalism was not restricted to marginalised maverick businessmen outside 
mainstream opinion: within this mainstream there were some important businessmen, 
like Sir Paul Chambers, supportive of neoliberal ideas for much of the post-war period. 
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The paradigm shift, therefore, from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, so often presented 
as revolutionary, had wider roots in British society than conventionally depicted. 
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